

*Congress N.Y. May*

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BETTER LATE THAN NEVER !

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AN IMPARTIAL REVIEW OF

MR. PITT'S

ADMINISTRATION,

ON THE

Ground of Responsibility, during the present War.

TO WHICH ARE ADDED

CURSORY REMARKS ON THE TWO LAST CAMPAIGNS;

THE WHOLE BEING

A full elucidation of Mr. PITT's new way

To Conquer by *Degrees*.

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By an *ENEMY* to the *WAR*

ON ITS ORIGINAL PARTIAL PRINCIPLES,

But a *SINCERE WELL-WISHER* to

The KING and CONSTITUTION

Of GREAT BRITAIN.

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ADDRESSED

To the Hon. <sup>*13th Feb*</sup> ~~CHARLES~~ JENKINSON.

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There is no resource so firm for the Government of the united States as the affection of the people guided by an enlightened policy ; and to this primary good, nothing can conduce more than a faithful representation of public proceedings, diffused, without restraint through the United States.

Vide General Washington's Speech to the Congress.

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L O N D O N ;

PRINTED FOR J. JOHNSON, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH YARD,

1794.

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*Banks* TO THE  
HON. CHARLES JENKINSON, ESQR.

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THE man who presumes to dedicate these loose observations, has only seen you once ; which was after you had visited Coblenz in the summer of 1792. You were then at Bruxelles, and lodged at the Belle-vue in the Park, most probably to be near Lord Elgin.

You were dressed in the Windsor uniform---that is to say ; you had on a blue Coat with red cuffs and Cape. You sat in the Court-box, on the right hand side as you front the stage.

I never shall forget the awful impression which, in spite of its diminutive contour, your countenance made upon me and an Imperial Officer, who was next to me. We were seated in that humble, but respectable place, called the Parquet Militaire, between the Orchestra and the Pit. The War naturally became a topic of conversation, in the intervals of the acts, &c. and you of consequence were mentioned as the Son of Lord Hawkesbury.

Hav.

*Having informed my neighbour, that you were looked upon by some people in England, as a very wonderful promise of Political Sagacity, he requested to know, whether it was the received opinion among us, that England would join the Empire ? I answered, that it was impossible for me to give him any information on that head, but I presumed she would from your familiarity at Coblentz. He replied, that it appeared extraordinary she had not already declared, since every body knew, that the House of Hanover must ultimately join the League. This sbrewd remark led me to reflect on the different preparatory measures, which might be adopted by the Minister, before he openly avowed his principles; and I could not help conceiving, that you were upon some secret mission, and that the Cabinet of Great Britain only waited for your information, to enter decidedly into Hostilities. But I honestly confess, that neither the Imperialist nor myself harboured the faintest idea of what your proposed plan of operations might be. We little imagined (as a temporary visit to Coblentz, and a partial view of the Prussian Army, must have afforded you an intimate knowledge of the French in all the intricacies of their unprecedented Revolution ! ) that the rapidity of your*  
*ideal*

*ideal march to Paris, from the confines of Austria, would only be outstripped by the retrograde motions of the Allied armies to the Rhine: nor could we, for a moment, suspect, that while a mind, enlarged, like yours, by much reading and the instructions of a political Father, had suddenly conceived the vast and wonderful notion of reducing events and circumstances into a system of your own abroad, limited exertions and partial views might ruin it at home. It did not perhaps occur to you and your instructors, that as impression is the first avenue to influence, influence the direct path to confidence, and confidence the ground-work of authority, the same means were to be pursued for their establishment in France, as have been followed with so much, success, by the Minister and his Friends in England. You had probably forgot---for great minds may forget! that while an army was pressing towards a given point, on a very extended line of operation, the opposing enemy might easily outflank and possibly destroy it; nor did you perhaps recollect, that Twenty Five Millions of inhabitants, (Eight Millions of whom were capable of bearing Arms) were to be prepared for order, by the gradual influence of opinion, before it was prudent to reduce them by Force; and*

*when*



*when the alternative became necessary, you did not possibly remember, that, as the Royalists would certainly rise, and form no inconsiderable object of diversion in favour of the allies on one side, Great Britain, by a Debarkation in Britanny, might successfully co-operate on the other.*

*You see, Sir, that I am a plain unlettered man; a calm observer of the times, and somewhat of a sceptic in the intrigues of Court---The little I know, has been collected from an intercourse with mankind at large, and the acquirement of a certain standard in politics, by which my individual opinion might be sanctioned by events, I have had, thank God, neither the infirmities of age, nor the visitation of disease to encounter, during an intimacy of some months with the troubled scenes of three different Revolutions, and I am presumptuous enough to hope, that I shall outlive the present----*

*I have the honour to be*

*Sir, your very obedient humble servant*

*The AUTHOR.*

*October 31st, 1794.*

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## ADVERTISEMENT.

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AS we are in times when the sentiments of individuals are tortured into the most illiberal constructions, with respect to Public principles, the Author of the following sheets thinks it necessary to say, that although Administration have hitherto in *his* opinion, been extremely mistaken in their manner of conducting the War, he is by no means an advocate for Peace, at the *expence* of British honour or security. There are resources enough in this country, to oppose any unreasonable claim of a victorious enemy, provided we can ascertain the assistance, and be safe in the cooperation of our Allies. Nor is it impossible, but some negotiation may be opened with our *once* united friends and brethern the Americans, to baffle the designs of insidious foes, who would readily revenge themselves upon England, by destroying every connection she possesses.

It

It is high time, that Party-spirit should give way to Public necessity ; and as it is the inherent right of every citizen of a free country, to expose the errors, of those who hold his life and property in trust ; so is it a peculiar duty to accompany his remarks, by whatever remedies, experience or education may have placed within his reach. Such is the intent, and such the purport of this little Pamphlet. The ensuing Spring will most probably decide on the fate of France or Great Britain. As it is *never too late to mend*, may we take advantage of our past misfortunes, and either make an honourable Peace, or fight united as our fathers have done before us.



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## BETTER LATE THAN NEVER.

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IT is somewhat singular that notwithstanding the daily conviction which a concatenation of events must press upon the minds of our ministers relative to the impolicy of our unfortunate Contest with the French, pertinacity, pride, or ignorance should still continue to be enamoured with their blunders. A Roman politician and writer has justly observed, that when once a knave or blockhead begins to stumble, it behoves him to go down the descent of error and guilt with intrepid impudence---*Cum semel fines verecundiæ transieris naviter decet esse impudentem!* I submit this quotation to the calm consideration of that middle class of people in Great Britain, who have too much  
good

good sense to be dazzled by fine speeches, too much honour to be duped by ostentation, and too much spirit to be alarmed by managed fictions. Mr. Pitt, if my memory does not betray me, once remarked in the House of Commons, that the objects for the attainment of which England had embarked in the confederacy of Europe, could only be obtained by cautiously attending to events, and by a close adherence to what he ingeniously called *Degrees*. This extraordinary doctrine was first given in answer to some very pertinent observations which were made by Mr. Fox on the necessity of Peace. Its principal intent, however, was not so much to controvert that salutary end, as to obviate the means which were suggested to obtain it; with what safety they might have been adopted, time has sufficiently proved: for what purposes and with what consistency they were rejected, a calm examination of events may shew.

The Minister and his memorable majority of passive and apostate *Ayes*, after  
having

having been hunted down, through every double of trick and sophistry, into an acknowledgement of the propriety of Peace, found a last resort in the subtlety of *Negotiation*. They were well apprized of the bad reception which any further intrusion of argument, in favour of offensive measures, must meet among the people at large, and consequently had recourse to such expedients only, as, by their novelty and art, might arrest for a time the plain career of facts and puzzle Opposition. It was not difficult to convert the occasional overthrow of the different reigning factions in France into an impossibility of treating with a Nation, which appeared to have no other security to offer, than the temporary existence of men stained by the blood of their fellow creatures, and rivetted together by the most lamentable scenes of horror and inhumanity\*.

Ministers have not scrupled to declare, that if any avenue of negotiation could be

\* Vide Burke's Speech—What ! Treat with men  
th bloody hands !

opened

opened for the attainment of Peace, nothing should be wanting on their part to accelerate so desirable an issue. And is the memory of these men so feeble, or is our understanding of so thick a texture, that the pledged interference of Lord Auckland upon the skirts of Holland has escaped the one, and cannot obtain admission to the other? Have *They* forgotten the assurance, which we received and they most solemnly preferred, of not entering into the baffled projects of the Empire provided our allies the Dutch were shielded from invasion? And is the reluctance which the inhabitants of the united Provinces discovered not to move beyond their own confines, so readily effaced, that these men will attempt to stifle the murmurs amongst *us* by publishing an unqualified disposition for hostilities in *Them*? Let us appeal to the yet existing remnant of that brave devoted handful of Britons, who after having been hurried from their own defenceless shores for purposes, as yet unknown, have been precipitately dragged beyond the Towns they were pledged to garrison, and are now driven from  
their

their original position with every vestige of discomfiture about them. Those men will not scruple to tell us, that so far from having been received by the Dutch like friends, so far from being looked upon as the original saviours of their country, and now as their companions in arms, they are considered as the duped destroyers of their peace and commerce; as incumbent locusts upon a land which might once have been guaranteed and saved from plunder, but which is now rendered, not only an object of acquisition from its wealth, but a strong incentive to revenge, from the injuries we have done their invaders.

An Author, who seems to have studied the French Revolution with a severe attention to existing facts, has justly remarked, that, “ In the actual noise and tumult of a revolution, it is the misfortune of cotemporary people, taken in the aggregate, never to attain that accurate knowledge of *causes* and *effects* which would preclude falshood and misinterpretation. The jarring state of interests, the unavoidable consequence of broken compacts, the effervescence of  
the



the common mind, so readily worked up by the subtlety of statesmen at home, or the aspiring ambition of commanders abroad, necessarily give birth to all the ebullitions of hazard and conjecture. As parties form, prejudice, interest, and ingenuity succeed ; and before any sort of permanent establishment can take place, different men and measures, like particles in a chymical preparation, must bubble and boil over : nor can the desired object be obtained till after a variety of experiments. France has already had her national Assemblies ; they have passed away, and if the situation of things, and the unsettled state of the public mind may be resorted to for opinion, it is more than probable that the present national Convention will share the same fate."

Had the Ministers of this country, warily attended to the several events, which, like effects, proceeding from established causes, have regularly taken place, instead of precipitately rushing into a continental war, we might at this moment have been at the highest pinnacle of commercial prosperity.

The

The professions which were lavishly made towards the French, in the infancy of their Revolution, the neutrality which we observed for some time after, and the apparent reluctance which we discovered at the first commencement of hostilities, must induce every thinking man to believe, that administration either saw those advantages or insidiously kept back in order to assist with greater efficacy the wild confederacy of two rival courts\*.

\* The Courts of Vienna and Berlin.

The following extract from a paper which was transmitted to England in August 1792, and had been originally published in France, may prove, that the friendship of this country was by no means an object of indifference to the People at large ; and the Extracts which follow may perhaps convince the World, that the Cabinet of Great Britain either acted a double, or an irresolute part.

“ Scandalous reports presage to us a rupture on your part—Calumny says you are arming against us. Would you join the Lion, symbol of English Courage, with blood-hounds, &c. who dare not attack the Fox, but at that instant when the Pack is strongest, and most numerous ? Far from us be such a system of cowardice ; for if France expires under the stroke of England, she will not have to reproach herself with dying twice.

How

Viewing the conduct of ministry in this last light only, we must acquit Mr. Pitt of having wilfully resisted the welfare of his country, because no man will attempt to prove

“ How far have these reflections carried us ! Citizens always free ! Englishmen always generous ! That *tyranny* which you have proscribed cannot but raise your indignation ; but if—A thing impossible ! Despotism can have any attractions with you ; shun France ; for instead of a Scepter, she will present nothing but Graves ; then may your pious tears water the ashes of Frenchmen, who are your friends and brothers.”

Ferron, President.

Leguern, Secretary.

This Extract, which might be supposed to be a partial one, (having been issued from Cherburg,) is considerably strengthened by the following passages, from two public Papers, which were printed by Authority at Paris in the same month.

“ France long before her own Revolution, had condemned one of her Kings, who obstructed so passionately that last révolution to which England owes her Liberty, and the House of Hanover her Crown. What right had a French King to oppose the exercise of an unalienable right in the English people, to change their own government, and to alter the line of succession to their Crown ? And how comes it to pass, that the Cabinet of St. James’s should at present adopt

prove his conviction of it, but who will be romantic enough to defend his measures in the continuance of this lamentable contest? Who will so far sacrifice his own

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good

adopt the principles which it reprobated not a century ago? If France has not a right to change her Constitution, nor to suspend her executive Power, we must then conclude that the English are rebels, and the House of Hanover an Usurper. But assuredly no Englishman, no well informed man, will maintain such a doctrine; and indeed the French Nation is far from apprehending any hostile disposition on the side of England, the assurances of whose government are solid, and the friendship and loyalty of whose people may be depended on. When the cabinet of St. James's shall have more calmly compared the conduct of the French, with the true principles of policy, it will clearly see, that the French Nation, has alone a right to decide, by its representatives, whether the first public functionary have incurred forfeiture, and whether the Constitution is to be the exclusive mode of the Government of the Nation, in whose decisions on these points no earthly power has a right to interfere."——Vide Copy of the Declaration agreed to by the last National assembly of France.

To these quotations (which, with innumerable other instances, sufficiently prove, that France cautiously avoided a rupture with Great Britain) may not improperly be added the subsequent passages from  
M.

good sense, and the unquestionable authority of facts, as to attack sagacity or common prudence, to any one suggested plan or operation upon the Continent.

When

M. De Chauvelin's and Lord Grenville's Correspondence in 1792.

“The measures which the Court of Vienna has employed with different powers, and chiefly with the Allies of his Britannic Majesty, to engage them in a quarrel, foreign to their interest, are known to all Europe ; if public report may be credited, the same success which it hath already had in the court of Berlin, may likewise be expected with the united Provinces. The menaces employed to different Members of the Germanic Body, to draw them from that prudent neutrality, which their political situation, and their dearest interest prescribe to them, the engagements taken with different Sovereigns of Italy to determine them to adopt hostilities against France ; and, in fine, the intrigues which have armed Russia against the Constitution of Poland, all afford new proofs of a great Conspiracy against Free States, which seems intended to plunge Europe in a general war.

“The consequences of such a conspiracy, formed by a combination of powers, so long rivals, will easily be perceived by his Britannic Majesty.

“The



When the Guards had successfully covered Holland, or to speak more candidly when Dumourier and his Victorious Army had been either unnerved by British gold, out-

“ The Balance of Europe, the Independence of its different States, the general peace, all which at every period have engrossed the attention of the English Government, are at present threatened with the most imminent danger.

“ The King of the French presents these weighty and important considerations to the attention and friendship of his Britannic Majesty. Deeply sensible of those marks of interest and affection which he has received from him, he invites him to employ in his wisdom, in his present situation, and in the plenitude of his influence, the means compatible with the independence of the French Nation, to stop while it may yet be effected, the progress of this combination, which threatens equally the peace, the liberty, and the happiness of Europe ; particularly to prevent, from acceding to this combination those of his allies, whom they may wish to draw into it, or even those who may already have been engaged in it by fear, artifice, and the different prettexts of a policy equally false and detestable.

The Minister Plenipotentiary of France  
Chauvelin.”

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outwitted by finesse, or rendered useless by the factious men in Paris, what knowledge of the French mind did Mr. Pitt evince to justify the headlong measures which

It will be said by the advocates of administration in favour of their consistency, that the Cabinet of St. James's actually did interfere to prevent the effusion of blood, but that the mediation of our Court was not accepted. The following extract from a public print which appeared in August, 1792, will best explain the disposition of Vienna and Berlin towards France, and shew in what estimation the boasted interposition of Great Britain was held by them. I must beg the indulgence of my reader for giving the extract at a greater length than I at first intended, but as the addition of two or more passages may prove the reluctance which ambition feels to surrender the most trifling prospect of success, be the consequence of a failure ever so fatal, I shall stand excused for their insertion here.

The answer given to our mediation was :

1. That the Court of Vienna could not accept it without offending the Princes, who were parties to the Concert, unless their consent should be previously obtained.

2. That matters were not yet sufficiently ripe to support a hope that any good effect could be produced

which were so unfortunately pursued ? Instead of calmly watching the unavoidable course of events, instead of comparing circumstances as they rose, and (however unpre-

duced by mediation, which is seldom of any use before some battles are won and lost on both sides.

*Inhuman policy ! as if the differences of Courts could not be settled without previously shedding the blood of Thousands, who neither know the cause they fight for, nor care for the effects it may produce. It is from a conduct of this sort, among Kings or their delegates, that Democracy draws arguments against modern institutions which cannot easily be refuted.*

3. The French, during the continuance of their present effervescence, would not listen to any proposal for a modification of their Constitution ; and that therefore as the *expences of the campaign had been already incurred*, both by Austria and Prussia, it was best that they should prosecute their plan, while there was the smallest prospect of success.

4. That such being the state of affairs, it was plain that England, convinced as she must be of the truth and justice of those principles, ought to continue a mere spectatrix of what was going on, and not raise her voice until the decisive moment arrived, when she might speak with effect.

5. That

unprecedented) drawing judicious deductions from them ; instead of warily balancing for a time, between action and forbearance, during the temporary effervescence of a long

5. That his Majesty the King of Hungary was nevertheless, obliged to the cabinet of St. James's for its good intentions ; but that he could not help at the same time observing, that if Great Britain meant to take any part at all in the business, her accession to the concert of *Princes* would more effectually stem the torrent of Jacobinism, and restore the peace of Europe, than a thousand mediations.

Such has been the language of the Court of Vienna to us ; but her language, when speaking of us, to our ally the King of Prussia, has not been quite so measured. In her communications with the court of Berlin, she has actually said, that, England had no other view in making an offer of her mediation, than to assume the appearance (and to build upon it some little merit) of feeling a concern for the general tranquillity of Europe, and of having done something towards restoring it.

Such is the light in which the mediation, and the ministers of this great Empire are held by the powers on the continent, whom we have often saved from ruin†.

† *The devout Queen of Hungary, for instance, when she was so closely pressed by the French.—England not only stepped*

long oppressed, and long insulted people, did he not hastily sanction the ill-judged progress into Flanders? Were not a handful of Britons hurried into scenes of slaughter, without one solid assurance of permanent success? The responsibility of which Ministry appeared so proud at the commencement of General Mack's decisive plan of operation---A plan only to be equalled in point of judgment by Mr. Jenkinson's march to Paris!---necessarily renders them liable to every species of interrogatory. *Qui fit per alium fit per se!* An apology therefore for arraigning Mr. Pitt at the tribunal of public opinion, be the instances of failure in our Generals ever so notoriously personal, must appear superfluous to every dispassionate mind. Let us then ask (and not invidiously, but with candour and impartiality) whether the perpetual tender of our brave devoted countrymen

*stepped forward to rescue her from impending destruction, but generously supplied her wants. The Emperor Joseph, who was then a babe in arms, returned the obligation during the American war, by being the most active coadjutor of the Empress of Russia, to enter into an armed neutrality against us.*



to undertake the relinquished difficulties of the Dutch at Menin and Lincelles, was one of those considerate *degrees* by which twenty five millions of inhabitants were to be suddenly reduced? Was the promised surrender of Dunkirk, the projected siege of Lille, and the boasted entry of his Royal Highness of York into the Capital, to be equalled in precipitancy of hope and folly by nothing but the tardiness of Lord Moira's expedition? Was that esteemed and meritorious Nobleman to be reserved for one of those desperate resorts of Ministerial cunning or necessity, which does not scruple to sacrifice the fame and comfort of an individual, under the plausible pretext of public advantage? If a diversion in Britanny was good policy in *Autumn*, (that the northern and eastern coasts might co-operate with the southern) common discretion should unquestionably have dictated measures for its attainment in *Spring*. It is not my intention either to compliment Lord Moira on the superiority of his judgment and foresight in this business, or to criminate Government for having drawn a curtain before acknowledged ability and worth,

worth, in order to gratify the more pleasing calls of interest and ambition. Setting out, as I have already professed to do, with an intention to lay before the thinking part of the Island, an unvarnished record of events, it would ill become me to enter into speculative discussions. An honest narrative of facts does not stand in need of hazarded conjecture, when there are events to unfold the most glaring system of interest, ignorance, and contradiction. Pertinacity and pride, as I have already observed, have appeared to be enamoured with their blunders ; what those blunders are, it is the duty of every member of a free community to expose. Candour at the same time necessarily dictates a suspension of judgment, until there are irrefragable proofs adduced to vindicate direct assertions. Let us then dispassionately canvas the conduct of Administration, during the memorable Campaign of 1793---An epoch that will hereafter exhibit in history the leading features of two rival nations ; and powerfully shew, how much more easy it is for a minister to obtain temporary reputation for himself and friends, than to preserve the national

wealth and character of others.---The natural good temper, and the proverbial credulity of Englishmen have, in fact, been too long amused, not to say insulted, by a partial representation of individual valour and good-sense. As if the limited speculations of Mr. Pitt, in the Alley, and his monopoly of the Funds, by means of an immense floating stock\*, or the confined advantage  
of

\* Mr. Pitt has ingeniously arranged his influence over the monied men, in such a manner, as to be able at any time to buy up every thing which might affect the Funds. From 14000 to 30000 per day have been used for this purpose—How far a conduct of this kind may agree with the principles of fair dealers, the man of business must determine—But woeful would be the hour should circumstances so combine, as to render the influx of stock commodity superior to the means of liquidation. Nor is an event, so truly fatal to the credit of the Nation, impossible or unlikely—when we consider the hourly exportation of specie from this country, we may reasonably conclude, that the faith and confidence of the merchant must be staggered and enfeebled. Even Mr. Angerstein may look upon a ministerial loan with some degree of suspicion. A very eminent Author, who seems to have written with too much truth a few years back, has afforded a melancholy picture of what a generous nation was reduced to—As we have escaped

of the Duke of York at Valenciennes, would eventually repay their enormous expenditure of blood and treasure. How far the anticipating projects of the statesman may be realized, time only can determine ; events have proved, that the visionary plans of the General, and consequently the concurrence of the War---minister, have been deplorably abortive. Parturiunt mon-

caped a crisis to full of terror and despair, that posterity, to use his own expressions, would not believe its history, we shall transcribe the passage, and leave it as a Beacon for the present times.

“This, Sir, is the detail. In one view behold a nation overwhelmed with debt : her revenues wasted ; her trade *not* declining only but *destroyed* ; the affections of her colonies *not merely* alienated, *but the whole western Empire torn from its parent country and eager to commence hostilities against her* ; the duties of the Magistrate transferred to the soldiery ; a gallant army, which never fought unwillingly but against their fellow subjects, mouldering away for want of the direction of a man of common abilities and spirit ; and, in the last instance, the administration of justice become odious and suspected to the whole body of the people. This deplorable scene admits of but one addition—that we are governed by counsels, from which a reasonable man can expect no remedy but poison, no relief but death.

mortis

montes exit ridiculus mus ! Such are the whimsical, but fatal fruits of ill-placed confidence and obstinate inexperience !

The sceptic, and the party-man, will naturally expect, that an exclamation so immediately opposite to their wishes and belief, should be followed by specific instances of error---These then, in my humble opinion, are the mistakes of 1793, which may be truly called the prolific sources of every calamity that the confederates now experience---From the partial victories of Famars, Lincelles, and Cateau, and from the capture of Valenciennes, Condè, and Quénoy may be reasonably dated the origin of their defeats, at the camp of Fleurus, the failure before Dunkirk, and the melancholy evacuation of Brabant, and West Flanders. To them we owe an unexampled loss of Towns and strong Holds, from which not even republican ardour and enthusiasm could have dislodged our united forces, had the injudicious conduct of the Duke of Brunswick, and the mischief of his execrable manifesto, been remedied by temper and good management---The En-  
gagement



gement of Gemappe, *even* the battle of Nerwinde, might have pointed out to our Allies the rashness and bad policy of the plans which were so eagerly adopted by *them*, and so justly laughed at by their opponents. When war is reduced to such a desperate issue, between two Nations, that common humanity deserts mankind, it essentially behoves the weakest never to adopt offensive operations until the stronger is enfeebled by events or fortune. The contest against France, was, from the first commencement of Hostilities, replete with danger, because it was conducted against principles and measures, which obtained energy from unprecedented causes, by the customary mode of court-intrigue and cabinet-speculation. From the miserable determination of Pilnitz, down to the erroneous system of the Congress at Antwerp, a fatality seemed to be interwoven with every counsel of the allies. Hazard and conjecture appear to have sat blindfold, with a chart before them, while the lives and properties of millions were disposed of without a single provision having been made for *possible* defeat. The Map, harmless

less and silent object of speculation ! presented nothing to ambition's eye but conquest and possession. It did not exhibit to the superficial gaze of men, accustomed to command, the stubborn spirit of millions determined to oppose. Hence those hasty conclusions, from which has flowed so much complicated error, in every instance of aggression on our part, and such uniform success on their's. Dazzled by the brilliancy of two or three prosperous impressions on the enemy's frontiers, we fondly imagined that the most limited advantages were permanent acquisitions. General Lloyd, has very sensibly observed " That when the Frontiers of contending powers are contiguous, the magazines formed in the country, which attacks, may for some time supply the invading army, until by a victory it is enabled to take some capital fortress, and secure a tract of the enemy's country, sufficient for a *depot* to support the whole, or a great part of the troops during the winter. If this cannot be executed, it is evident that the attacking army must, after a fruitless campaign, return to its own country. In proportion

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as an army advances into the enemy's country, new *depots* must be continually formed, and these as near as possible; for when they are at any considerable distance, the convoys arrive flow, requiring strong escorts, and are so precarious, that the army can neither move nor act, especially if the country is close, and the defending enemy active; let him give his whole attention to attack the invading army's communications, and he must live day and night on their line of operation. In general, Commanders mistake the principles of a defensive war, and very absurdly endeavour to check and stop the progress of an enemy, by opposing him in front, in some advantageous post, which method is, for the most part, ineffectual or dangerous. You are often forced to a general action, whose consequences may be fatal, as victory will enable your adversary to fix himself in some part of the country from whence, the ensuing campaign, he begins his operations sooner, and with additional advantages. This cannot be done, if you avoid a general action, and employ the greatest part of your forces on his line of  
ope-

operation, which is the only effectual and sure means to stop his progress ; let him advance in front, the length of his line will weaken it, and offer your attacks certain and decisive success."

Let us compare these principles with the conduct of our allies, and of his Royal Highness the Duke of York ; the reference will be in point, and the application, though hitherto neglected may be beneficial hereafter--**BETTER LATE THAN NEVER** is a very common, but by no means an unuseful proverb.

It is an observation of General Lloyd " That the English for the most part attend too much to the contracted, and very often selfish views of the merchants ; they act, he remarks, upon too narrow a scale, like traders, and seldom as a powerful nation. In forming treaties a Minister should have the whole globe before his eyes, and by no means confine himself to this or that province, or branch of trade ; these are not to be overlooked, but they must never serve as a foundation for a treaty, unless you mean to reduce the nation to a company of mercantile people."

In the prosecution of this lamentable contest with the French, Ministry, far from having the whole globe before their eyes, do not appear to have considered whether the enemy was to be *partially* attacked, or *generally* embarrassed ; engaged by treaties offensive, and defensive, they have precipitately pursued, whatever system the Continent dictated. Instead of applying all our resources to our Fleet, or putting the Army in such a formidable state as to be able not only to defend our possessions abroad, but to line our coasts at home, and be ready to cooperate with the Royalists on one side of France, while the confederates stood prepared for action on the other, temporary Levies have been made for no other apparent purpose than to enrich the Treasury by independent companies, or to disguise the wants of our manufacturers by the enlisting of their workmen. We shall speak more at large of this ambiguous policy in a subsequent page. At present it cannot be superfluous to explain, the annexed sketch, by shewing, from the best authority---would to God we had only speculative ideas to offer, and not the blood of

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thousands to confirm our observations !  
 ---That the extreme rashness and contradiction of the two last campaigns, may be equalled in absurdity by that of 1792, but cannot in calamity. To do this effectually, it will be necessary to submit, to the consideration of thinking men, an accurate line of the French Frontier, towards Austrian Flanders, Holland, and the Empire\*; leaving

\* As Spain did not assist at the Congress of Antwerp, I shall confine myself to those powers only, who may be properly said to constitute the leading points of attack in this memorable combination of alarmed Sovereignty.

\* The following report which has been made to the Committee of Public safety in Paris, on the taking of Crevecur will shew to what a pitch of valour and intrepidity the French have been excited. That the representation may be partial we are ready to allow, but events convince us, that much of it must be true.

“ This capture, important by the consequences which it must produce, is principally owing to the enterprize of Delmas, General of a division, who displays with much superiority, moral and physical arms in turn. Would you believe that he attacked this place with field pieces only ? With the same spirit he opened his trenches within 80 fathoms of the  
 Glacis

leaving him at the same time to draw conclusions from the enthusiastic spirit of opposition, which has uniformly actuated so many millions of people.

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Glacis, and the operation was conducted with the republican boldness, of which he gave the example to the troops he commands. It was *he* too who took a Fort within 250 fathoms of the body of the Fortress of Bois-Le-Duc. He cleared the pallisades on horseback, and was followed by eight regiments of Hussars. Pitt, Cobourg, York and William will certainly not approve of this mode of taking Forts, for they will not find it set down in their books of Tactics ; but it is only given to the French and Republican hardihood to pass the bounds of art with success."

Signed—Belle-Garde.

J. P. Lacombe of Tarn.

Such is the insulting language and such the Taunts that Englishmen must patiently endure, from a nation, which has been attacked with rashness and treated with contempt—Non sic olim !

It must be superfluous to enter into any particulars relative to the misfortunes of the Duke of Brunswick, or the suspended triumphs of Dumourier—These are too well known to require a repetition here ; but it cannot be ridiculous to observe, that in lieu of being benefited by the errors of 1792, the allies have made grosser mistakes in 1793 and 1794. The want of  
judg-

General Lloyd has stated, that the Frontier of France, towards Germany, begins at Basit in Switzerland, and runs into various directions from thence to Dunkirk, in French Flanders. He divides this long line into three parts, and considers each of them separately. The first part goes from Basel to Landau, and covers Alsatia; it is near 130 miles in length, The second part goes from Landau, to Sedan, on the Moselle, covers Lorain on the side of the Electorate of Treves, the Dutchies of Deux-Ponts, Luxemburg, and Limburg; it is 190 miles in length. From Sedan

judgment was more conspicuous in the latter, because the enemy was become more formidable, and the natural obstacles of the country were considerably increased by the increased resistance of the people.

The garrison and citizens of Landau resisted a bombardment with an energy which deserves to be mentioned in History. Landau received twenty five thousand bombs. For three weeks the garrison lived on horse-flesh and cat-flesh. Their only bread was of rye and peas—wheaten bread sold at fourteen livres the pound; sugar was eighty livres, and an egg sold for 100 livres.

*General Laubadere.*

down

down the Meuse, to Charlemont in French Flanders, and thence to Dunkirk, goes the third part, and is about 150 miles ; so that this whole Frontier is about 470 miles.

As I wish to be as concise as possible in my several extracts from this admirable work, I shall pass over the first and second part of the French Frontier, pages 111, 112, 113, and confine myself to the third and last, which runs from Sedan down the Meuse to Charlemont, from thence to Dunkirk, and is 150 miles in length. The judicious Reader will nevertheless bear in his recollection, that, while the Duke of Brunswick, and the King of Prussia were ruining the most formidable armies in Europe, by endeavouring to penetrate a few miles into Lorrain and Champagne, through the first and second line, the French with redoubled activity operated upon the third, and finally subdued all Flanders. Nor do I the least doubt but Holland would have fallen, and the whole of the combined army been outflanked, had not the spirit and perseverance of the soldiers, and the immense resources of the Nation

Nation been rendered ineffectual by the treachery of their Chiefs\*. The very difficulties which presented themselves to oppose the progress of the Allied army into France, facilitated every incursion of their enemies, as *the direction of the line which goes from Sedan to Landau is concave towards that part of Germany*. If we consider, for a moment, the relative situations of the Allied army as it stood in the opening of the first Campaign, and of the Northern French army at the conclusion of the same, we shall readily discover the limited operations of both; and by so doing, expose the less pardonable faults committed by General Maeck, Prince Cobourg, and the Duke of York in their visionary plans against the Third and last part of the French Frontier. "This line runs, to use General Lloyd's description of it, from Sedan down the Meuse to Charlemont, from thence to Dunkirk and is 150 miles

\* Vide the National reports of the conduct of Marshal Luckner, Generals Fayette, Montesquiou, Biron, Custine, Dumourier, Westerman, Lamorliere, Kellermann, Dillon, &c.



in length. It has been the scene of successive wars for near two centuries, the most expensive, bloody, and durable of any recorded in the annals of mankind.

“This line is stronger by art than nature, having a prodigious number of strong fortresses and posts upon it; moreover, it projects in many places, so that an enemy can enter no where, without having some of them in front, and on his flanks; his depots must be at Namur, Mons and Tournay. An army of forty thousand men, placed on the Sambre, and another of equal force about Condé, will so bridle his operations, that he cannot advance a step without imminent danger; for that army which we suppose on the Sambre, by masking Namur, penetrates into the country to\* Brussels, which will  
force

\* The justness of this observation appeared most manifest in General Dumourier's rapid possession of Brabant, through these identical points. The Imperialists, however, had entirely forgotten the solidity of the maxim, *Fas et ab hoste doceri*, in the dazzling schemes of novel enterprize. Cruel infatuation! by which millions are harrassed and destroyed, while a  
calm

force the enemy to retire, and abandon his own Frontier.

In the present state of Austrian Flanders, and the adjacent parts of Holland, nothing could prevent the two armies from over-running the above mentioned countries in one campaign.

In the war for the succession of Spain, at the beginning of the century, ten successful campaigns brought the allies no farther than Landrecy, not 30 miles from the Austrain frontiers ; a very inconsiderable defeat at Donain obliged Prince Eugene to raise the siege of that place, and in a short time abandon his conquests, the fruits of many victories.

I know most people suppose, that this was owing to the the defection of the English : had this never taken place, perhaps the allies might in time have advanced to

calm investigation of events might restore mankind to order and tranquility, and the calamities of war be terminated at a less expence of blood and treasure.

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Marne, and sent parties to the Soyne : but will any Officer suppose, that an army marching that line from Mons, Tournay, &c. could separate and take winter Quarters on the above mentioned Rivers while the French were in possession of Picardy, Normandy, and Champagne ? No, it is impossible ; the great fault of the French Generals when on the defensive, was to oppose the enemy in Front, whereas they should have operated against their Flanks\*.

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\* It is impossible to form a closer opinion, in epitome, of this grand operation, and of the accuracy of General Lloyd's remarks ; than by exhibiting to an experienced Officer the particulars of the memorable battle of Gemappe. An event, that will for ever prove the superiority of an enlarged mind, aided by invincible courage, over limited ideas of success and rash decision. So requisite are judgment and good sense to make an able officer ! Without entering into a minute detail of the whole engagement, which the inquisitive may see delineated with great accuracy in the second Volume of Jordan's Political state of Europe, page, 115, I will confine myself to those points only wherein the sagacity of Dumourier was so manifestly superior to the imprudence of Saxe Teschen, who commanded the Austrians.

Having

The first event of this long and bloody war shews the strength of this Frontier, and the prodigious resources of the House of Bourbon.

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Having made his necessary arrangements for a general attack upon the Austrians, (who according to the best accounts were between 17000 and 18000 infantry, with about 3000 odd hundred cavalry,) the French General ordered his artillery, consisting of twelve 16 pounders, twelve 12 pounders, and 12 field pieces to be advanced, and disposed along the Front of his line. "The Position of the Austrians, to use his own language, was formidable beyond description. Their right extending to the village of Gemappe, formed a square with their front and their left, which extended to the Causeway of Valenciennes.

"They were posted in all this length on a woody mountain, where they had erected, in an amphitheatre three tiers of Redoubts, furnished with 20 pieces of heavy artillery, at least as many field pieces, and three field pieces for each battalion; all of which amounted to near 100 pieces of cannon. We had as many, but the elevation of their batteries gave them a great advantage, had we persisted in endeavouring to terminate the affair by our artillery."

Dumourier.

Let us now submit to the calm reflection of every military man the actual position and state of the French army, particularly the center, which was composed of

From the description we have now given of the French Frontier towards Germany and Flanders, though very incomplete, it appears that an enemy, though his

of raw troops. Exposed to an incessant fire from these formidable Redoubts, on which they could make but little or no impression, they would have been entirely cut to pieces, had not the ill-judged measure of quitting their entrenchments been adopted by the Austrians. The policy of Dumourier, whose knowledge of the human heart is at least equal to his intrepidity, was evidently to draw the enemy from their impenetrable situation. Troops on whose courage the firmest reliance could be placed, had been disposed of in the wings, and were commanded by the most experienced of his Officers. These, he was confident would not fail to out-flank the enemy, provided he could confine *their* principal attack to the centre and induce them to leave the heights—How well he succeeded, and by what extraordinary exertions he forced back to the charge the yielding battalions of raw men, are circumstances too well known to require any further detail, but as the particulars of the last decisive operation may be grateful to the inquisitive, the following extract from his report to the French Convention cannot be superfluous:

“ Exactly at noon, the whole infantry instantaneously formed in columns, and advanced with the  
utmost



his dominions were on the upper Rhine, opposite to Alsace, would find it extremely difficult, or rather impossible, to conquer that province, from whence alone he could penetrate into Lorraine, &c.

That

utmost rapidity, and in the highest spirits, towards the intrenchments of the enemy. There was not one column whose head was behind another.

The Lower tier of redoubts was instantly and very successfully carried ; but the obstacles soon multiplying, our *centre became endangered*, and I was long before I perceived the enemy's cavalry preparing to enter the plain with a view of flanking our columns. I instantly dispatched thither Lieutenant General Egalite, who, by his cool valour, succeeded in instantly rallying the columns, which he led to the second tier of Redoubts. This attack I lost no time in supporting by the third regiment of Chasseurs, and the sixth of Hussars, which arrived very opportunely to check as well as charge the enemy's cavalry. I proceeded at the same time to the right\* where I discovered

\* Dumourier had two horses shot under him—On falling the first time in front of the line, there was a general exclamation *Ah ! Notre General est Mort !* which he instantly silenced by getting on another horse and crying out *Non ! me voila mes Enfants ! n'ayez pas peur nous gagnerons ! No ! here I am my Children don't be afraid we shall gain the day !* The Author of this pamphlet had these and other  
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That the second part of the French Frontier, from Landau to the Meuse, cannot be attacked by any German power marching up the Moselle, between the Rhine

vered that after a complete success on the part of General Bournonville in the attack of the redoubts which had been forced and carried, some degree of disorder had manifested itself in his Cavalry, whilst the General himself was busied at the head of his In-

minutiæ told him by a wounded Soldier whom he assisted to get to the Hospital at Bapaume in 1792, and who was in the front rank when the above circumstance happened. He further added, that the several attacks made previous to the last general action on the 7th at noon were only feints to see how the centre would behave, and whether the enemy might be enticed from their formidable position. He acknowledged that cannon was placed in the rear of the raw troops, supported by some veterans, who had orders to force them back upon the Austrians; a measure, which though it cost the lives of thousands, secured the victory. Upwards of 14000 French were killed on this memorable occasion, and about 5000 Austrians. The loss of the former was however concealed by the skill and activity of Dumourier, who had the bodies conveyed away in the night, and buried in the neighbouring Coal-Pits &c. so that in the morning of the 8th the marks of slaughter left by the Austrians were visibly more than those of the French. To compare the conduct of the Austrian General on this occasion with the grand plan of Invasion adopted by the allies on a more extended scale, may not be thought inapposite or trite, since the same limited principles of action, which occasioned the loss of the battle of Gemappe, have continued to influence every subsequent operation against the Iron Frontier of French Flanders.

fantry

Rhine and the Meuse, the events of the different wars, waged in Flanders, prove the superiority of the French; I mean the superior advantages they possess in acting  
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fantry. This Cavalry I instantly rallied, and at the very instant it made a very lively charge on the enemy's cavalry, which had by' this time reached our right Flank. At this juncture a body of the enemy's cavalry attempted to force the first battalion of Paris, which received them with the utmost bravery, and killed 60 men with a single discharge. When we were thus engaged to the right, our left had carried the Village of Gemappe, and our centre had obtained entire possession of the second tier of redoubts. It became necessary once more to come to an action on the heights ; this, however, was less lively, and of a shorter duration, the Austrians being altogether panic-struck at the obstinate and constantly increasing valour of our troops. At two o'Clock they retired in the utmost disorder, our troops now occupying all the enemy's territory covered with the dead of both parties."

Dumourier.

It must be manifest to every thinking mind, that had the Austrians remained upon the defensive, and not quitted the heights to engage the centre of the French in the plains under Gemappe, the latter must unavoidably have been defeated. Dumourier was so conscious of their superiority in this respect,  
that

on that Frontier, which are indeed so very great, that no forces can be collected and supported in Flanders by the House of Austria, the English, Dutch, or the German Princes which can preserve that country against the efforts of the French ; most certainly the Austrains alone cannot do it.

The French Frontier, towards Switzerland, Savoy, and Spain, are too strong to be invaded by those powers. The idea of passing the Var, and conquering Provence, is too ridiculous to deserve a serious discussion."

Such is the formidable situation of France towards every point on which the allied armies have endeavoured to operate with effect, during the three last unfortu-

that he left no measure untried to draw them down: His prodigious loss of men, which, notwithstanding his *first* political account of 300 only, was nearly 14000, sufficiently proves the original advantages of the Austrians—Nor would he have continued the attack on the 7th, had he not been persuaded that the enemy might be outflanked by an able manœuvre in his centre.

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nate Campaigns. Equally strong on their side---if not wholly by position, *at least* by discipline and order---it behoved the Imperialists to remain in a constant state of preparation, to have resisted the incursions of the French, and patiently to have waited until an opportunity offered of co-operating with the Royalists within the Kingdom, and their confederates the Dutch and the English without. I do not speak advisedly, but merely on conjecture, when I presume to say, that had the reestablishment of order in France been properly planned and *honestly* pursued in 1792 or 1793, The allies might not only have remained in possession of the Low Countries, but must have dictated terms of pacification to that distracted country. From an assertion of this sort it will naturally be expected, that something should be offered by which the impolicy of the combined system may be clearly seen, and the feasibility of other measures be established. Events, in addition to General Lloyd's just observations, have sufficiently proved the first ; how the latter might have been, and probably still *may be* effected, let us  
now



now examine. In so doing we shall hastily pass over the disastrous period of the Duke of Brunswick's first impression ; observing only, that had a regular system of official intelligence existed between the different Courts at the opening of the Campaign ; had the principles of the Revolution been traced back, the machinations of private individuals warily followed, the emigration of the French Nobility viewed in a proper light ; the natural propensity of the multitude to overturn good order whenever the relinquished property of others enticed them to rebel, placed in contrast to the yielding temper of their unfortunate Monarch ; had these several important objects been considered, the reestablishment of government over twenty five millions of people (eight millions of whom were capable of bearing arms) would hardly have been trusted to a partial attack upon the most formidable points. There would have been a general cooperation of intellect and manhood, a calm attention to circumstances and events, and a steady adherence to well digested measures. Decision would have superseded the fluctu-

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ating conduct of the British Cabinet on one side, and a faithful understanding actuated every part of the Confederacy on the other. Not that any immediate offensive operations from a foreign enemy could have reduced the people, but that a state of formidable preparation might have enfeebled the growing enthusiasm of emancipated millions. It was, and I fear it is *still* a mistaken notion amongst *us*, that the reputation of arms would easily get the better of the force of principles. The influence of opinion, it was fondly believed, would not fail to produce that sort of impression which at once unnerves the\* boldest and renders them subservient to controul.

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\* The Writer of these remarks perfectly recollects a period when the interference of Great Britain might have realized this supposition. Previous to the Battle of Gemappe, (which may be truly said to be the first decisive action in favour of the Revolution,) the superiority of this country was so impressed upon the minds of the Soldiery, that the very idea of England remaining neutral gave additional vigour to their exertions. An Austrian Officer on the other hand, remarked at the commencement of Hostilities, that the Cabinet of St. James's was extremely mysterious—He justly remarked, that as England, from its close connection

I am far from endeavouring to establish an entire contradiction to this axiom in politics, or from wishing to insinuate that human nature, in subjection, is not to be awed by a formidable appearance of coercion. On the contrary, I know and I am persuaded, that the aggregate of mankind are more easily confined within the bounds of order by an anticipation of Violence, than forced back into the limits, they have exceeded, by slaughter and destruction. The ill-judged, not to say the cowardly departure of the Nobles from Paris, left Louis the Sixteenth in a situation from which a man of greater energy and talents

nection with Germany through the Electorate of Hanover, must inevitably join the League, it would prove some consistency in our councils to cooperate immediately with the Empire and Prussia, for the attainment of general tranquility. I give this observation of the Imperialist not as a vindication of hostilities on our part—since they *might* have been avoided—but as a well merited reproof against Ministry for their limited views and instability. Our exertions, in fact, have been more like the pitiful attempts of a foolish Gambler to recover a large loss, than like the spirited speculations of a man assisted by immense resources.

would

would not without difficulty have been extricated. But he was very far from being so destitute of authority, as not to have been able to govern the nation, (in spite of the Duke of Orleans and his infernal Agents) had the consistency of his counsels at home given energy to the influence of his friends abroad. Unfortunately for him, and equally so for his Allies, there was neither a spirit of decision to be discovered at Versailles, nor one vestige of a well directed policy from the execrable junto at Pilnitz, down to the published manifestoes of Coblenz, Bruxelles, and Verdun\*. Melancholy effect of ill-placed confidence on one side, and arrogant ambition on the other!

As the principal cause of the failure of the allied Armies may be easily traced to the want of a comprehensive view of things in the outset of this mysterious combination of partial pride and general

\* The secret of the Prussian retreat at this melancholy period seems at length to have reached public faith. To those men, who visited the country and watched events and circumstances, it always was unquestionable.

mistrust, I shall wave the innumerable instances of error which have disgraced the Field and Cabinet, during the three different periods, and hazard a few conjectures of my own on a system directly opposite to those which have been followed. At the same time, I will honestly acknowledge, that as the French Revolution was unprecedented in the annals of mankind, every species of opposition to its progress, was certain to encounter strange and complicated difficulties. The origin of it, however, was by no means so sudden as to preclude caution and foresight. To the want of these may be justly attributed all the calamities which distress England and her Allies at this moment. Hence the ascendancy of every faction in Paris, the consequent defection of the Provinces, the accumulation of interests inimical to Royalty, the union of opinion among the people and soldiery, the final dissolution of order and subordination, the death of Louis, and the blood-stained revolutionary system that has existed ever since---But hence, above all others, those principles of plunder and desolation, which have excited a  
gene-



general pervading interest in aggression on the side of France, when a state of armed preparation and defence on the part of Austria, Prussia, Holland, and Great Britain, might have overawed the country\*. It was most unquestionably within the diplomatic reach of Earl Gower at Paris, or of Lord Elgin at Bruxelles to have acquired an unequivocal standard of the public disposition in France, during the struggles of August and September. *They* might easily have drawn conclusions, by no means favourable to the actual invasion of the country, through the strongest line of Frontier that art has ever formed, and,

\* This brings to my recollection a particular circumstance which occurred two days before the action at Pont-Rouge, previous to the Battle of Gemappe. Being in company with some of the Gens D'armes, they repeatedly toasted the English exclaiming *Ah ! les braves Anglois ! pourvu que l'Angleterre reste neutre, nous n'avons rien a craindre ; mais si elle se declare, bas les Armes ! Oh the brave English ! If England remains neuter, we have nothing to fear, but should she declare against us, down go our Arms !* I give this anecdote in the unaffected language of a disciplined Soldier, on the eve of Battle, to shew what the general sentiments of the people were.

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by transmitting unequivocal information, have induced the Cabinet of St. James's either to observe the strictest neutrality, or to join in the confederacy, by exerting those immense resources which Great Britain *should* command. But alas, like a sunbeam dissected by the prism, every event has been viewed by the microscopic eye of limited speculation. The grand assemblage of public interests has been broken into the most exiguous particles of private consideration, and while the secure possession of ministerial influence has engrossed the attention of the Court at home, the national character and consequence have been gradually impaired abroad. Intent upon obtaining the most unbounded confidence among the monied men of the city, Mr. Pitt reluctantly attended to those events and circumstances which must inevitably weaken, if not destroy his interest in that quarter. Peace was therefore his best resource---How that valuable object was laid by, let Calonne and his associates at Wimbledon pronounce. Outwitted by the machinations of his *friends* upon the continent, he was ultimately bullied

lied into hostilities by those he dared not contradict in England.

We have already asserted that viewing the conduct of Ministry in a light of Political aggression only, we must acquit Mr. *Pitt of having wilfully resisted the welfare of his country, because no man will attempt to prove his conviction of it; but who will be romantic enough to defend his measures in the continuance of this lamentable Contest?* Let us dismiss the hacknied language of the times, leave closetted intrigue to conjure up alarms upon the frightful bugbear of Jacobinism, and whilst we calmly steer from the contradictory systems of levelling Discontent and masked equality, let us, with candour and precision, point out the advantages which might have resulted from a steady determined plan of General Defence\* in 1792. These  
advan-

\* While the Brissotine Faction was inundating Europe with Declarations of rights, and secretly laying the foundations of a civil War, by the introduction of a fœderal Constitution, it behoved us and our Allies to release the public mind in France from  
that

advantages will appear more manifest from the rash and impolitic conduct of the French at that period. General Lloyd, to whom I am indebted for a confirmation of much hazarded assertion, remarks with great judgment that, “The extreme difficulty of *collecting, uniting, and directing* the national Forces in a republican government, shews that it is by no means calculated for war, and much less for an *offensive* one. Its principles, being founded in Equality, it is evident, that war of every kind, ought to be avoided, because it necessarily throws too much power into the hands of one or few men, which finally destroy the government. It is also from the want of unity and sufficient force to exert the powers of the state, that all confederacies, however formidable, have failed in their schemes, if the war, has been of any long

that extreme tension of anxiety and phrensy, which drove Thousands into action who would otherwise have yielded to the moderate suggestions of concord and tranquillity. By the tardiness of our cooperation we, in fact, afforded their armies opportunities of feeling the superiority of numbers, and by a mixture of discipline, the advantages of union.

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duration. The famous league of Cambray, the leagues formed against France at different times, and against Austria; that against Prussia in the last war, and a hundred more, were dissolved without producing any effect proportioned to their force." In another place this intelligent writer accurately observes that, " Republics, unless formed into military principles, as was that of the Romans, are totally unfit for action. Nothing could unite the Greek republics against Persia till the time of Alexander the Great, when they had nearly lost their liberty; but when attacked, what prodigious efforts did they not make for the common cause! It is certainly true, that republics, unless forced by the immediate sense of danger, never have that unanimity and vigour necessary to carry on a war with any probability of success, and therefore are proper only for a defensive war."

To an unequivocal and steady observance of these natural principles, America stood indebted for her independence; while through a neglect of the same in the Campaign of 1792, France almost fell a victim  
to



to the Empire ; notwithstanding the rapidity of her former conquests in Brabant, Holland, and Wesphalia, and the undiminished valour of her Troops,

The judicious Reader will readily perceive that, for brevity sake, I am hastening to that period when Great Britain and her Allies might have benefited by the errors of the first campaign ; and (if circumstances invited, as they certainly *did*,) when advantages might have been taken of the internal broils of our distracted neighbours. I shall neither dwell upon the Minister's want of intelligence in the opening of 1793, the blunders of the congress at Antwerp, or the visionary plans of General Mæck ; nor can I have occasion to press upon his recollection a firm opinion, that almost all our calamities have arisen from an ignorance of the *real* situation of France ; and upon an eager adoption of suggestions, which, though originally good, became abortive and detrimental from being embraced too late. Far be it from me likewise to draw invidious conclusions from the notorious deficiency of those im-

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mediate means of cooperation which a ten years Peace *should* have abundantly provided. Before we actually engaged against France, and became, not auxiliaries only but principals in the contest, it should have been considered, whether the exertions of this country would keep pace with the activity of the French, in the necessary preparations of a War by Sea and Land ; and whether our Allies the Dutch, (who never fought *willingly* except against Great Britain ! ) would be roused from their national lethargy, and lend us maritime assistance ? It should have been considered, whether our ships of war would be manned as easily as they might be put in commission ; and whether, in case of a Descent upon the Coast of France, we had ammunition, arms, and cloathing for the Royalists, as well as men, at a moment's notice ? Let us suppose, that instead of precipitately rushing into offensive measures, and making a partial attack upon the strongest line in Europe, that the confederates\* had *bo-*

\* Austria, Prussia, the circles of Germany, Holland, Great Britain, Spain and Sardinia !

*nestly* endeavoured to resist the inroads of a rash imprudent people, and had rested upon their arms, until time and circumstances should lay them open to aggression ; let us suppose (and the supposition is by no means chimerical) that after Cobourg had driven the French beyond their own Frontiers, additional succours had arrived from the Empire, and the whole of Austrian Flanders, from Ostend to Luxemburgh, and from thence to Landau had been lined with Troops ; that England, on the other hand, had had a formidable Fleet at Spithead, three flying Squadrons between Portsmouth and the Nore, and a second Fleet stationed in the Downs, for whatever service the exigency of the country might require ; That the Militia had been instantly embodied, and the Line augmented to a third more than it is at present ; that Holland, being secured from the invasion of the Enemy, had exerted herself in the Texel, and been ready to cooperate with Great Britain, whenever there should be occasion to act *offensively* against France ; that a well digested plan of operation on the coast of Brittany had been always ready

to correspond with the exertions of the Royalists in La Vendée, the disaffection of Provence, and the sudden movement of the Allied armies ; on a supposition of this sort, what would the probable events have been ? I am presumptuous enough to believe, that the people at large would have returned to their allegiance, under certain modifications, and an end been put to the most inveterate scourge that ever visited mankind. The different Factions, (which, like bubbles on a stormy sea, may appear amidst the vortex of a Revolution, but never can interrupt the solid impulse of a Nation) would have yielded, or been forced to yield, to the visible wish of the majority. The systems of plunder, proscription, and confiscation, which have so notoriously disgraced the measures of the Convention, must have been superseded by principles of honourable restitution ; Royalty, corrected of its errors, would have been reinstated, and a lasting barrier been placed between the abuses of Power and the grievances of Subjection.

I have endeavoured, in as succinct and precise a manner as extreme hurry, much avocation, and a very limited indulgence of time would permit\*, to afford the man of military experience, an imperfect idea of what *might* have been effected, had the operations of the Campaign, in Spring 1793, been conducted with common prudence. The Rubicon was crossed; and although much, very much, had been neglected, previous to the declaration of war on the part of Great Britain, there were resources enough among the Confederates to have seconded the Royalists by a general cooperation of forces†. The same advantages which

\* The whole of this Pamphlet as well as the annexed Sketch will have been written, sent to press, and printed off, in Fourteen Days.

† The following statement of the Forces, belonging to the different powers, who should have *honestly* exerted themselves for the restoration of order, will best explain what a cooperation might have effected. It will not be difficult for the politician and the military man to allot the several proportions.

Austria 282000—Netherlands 3000—German Empire 40000—Hesse Cassel 15000—Saxony and Lusatia 26000—Prussia 206000—England 78000  
Scot-



which seem to have concurred in favour of the French, *must* have operated for *them*, had the same honest exertions and good policy prevailed. With respect to *Principles*, (of which so much has been said to cover palpable mistakes,) were not the disturbances of the South, and the open insurrection of La Vendée, circumstances more flattering to the wellwishers of Royalty than the passive sullenness of the Flemings, or the lethargic congratulations of the Dutch? Has there been one declared opposition to the progress of the Allied armies, or one violation of faith during the stay of the British, &c. upon the confines of the Belligerent powers, to sanction any formidable idea of Republicanism amongst them? Were not the Imperialists, on the contrary, caressed and courted by the inhabitants of every Town and Village, when they had driven their invaders from them, after the memorable battle of Nerwinde? The

Scotland, Ireland, and Wales 58000—Hanover 20000—Spain 62000—Sardinia and Savoy 26000  
Holland 36000 being in the whole 866500 men in arms.

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defection of Dumourier, so eagerly embraced by Prince Cobourg as an opening of success, was in the opinion of every man, who had intimately studied the character of the French, a retardment to that restoration of order which seemed to be the object of his Manifesto---Sound policy directed at that favourable Epoch, that the Frontier of the Austrian Netherlands and West Flanders should be lined with his victorious troops, &c. That the Duke of York should continue stationary upon the Skirts of Holland ; Prussia, and a considerable body of Imperialists be disposed of from Luxemburg to the opposite situation of the extreme Line of the French Frontier towards Basil ; Spain and Sardinia be ready to act, on the shortest notice towards the Pyrenees ; whilst on the other hand, England, with a grand Fleet at Spithead, a secondary one in the Downs, and three flying Squadrons always at command, with a certain number of Gun-boats in both quarters, would, with a necessary number of Transports for the reception of Troops, &c. have renewed that formidable impres-

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sion on the minds of the people, which had been frittered away by temporary exertions. Much as I admire and venerate Earl Moira's character and sentiments, it is not flattery to assert, that he was the only ostensible man, who, on this occasion, saw the many advantages which might have been derived from a general cooperation. But *he*, alas ! was not in Administration ! To his credit however, and to his honour be it said, that although his suggestions---I might perhaps go further and add, with correctness, his services---were slighted at the opening of the Campaign in 1793, the wisdom and propriety of them pressed too closely, not to induce ministry to invite his military talents into action by an intimation of his Majesty's pleasure at the approaching conclusion of it. With what alacrity, zeal, and military knowledge this meritorious Nobleman hazarded his life, reputation, and comfort to answer the most refined sentiments of honour and consistency, let his embarking at Portsmouth in November 1793, when he had not only the inclemencies of the season to encounter

ter, but some official obstacles\* likewise ; (witness his deficiency of ammunition, &c. two days before his departure) let his approach to the coast of Brittany, his return to Lymington, and his manifold personal sacri-

\* That the Royalists in La Vendée have given, and still give considerable uneasiness to the Convention must appear manifest to every thinking man. When the plan of attacking Maritime Flanders and Brabant, which has since so successfully been pursued, was actually commenced by Pichegru in the Autumn of 1793, his progress was suddenly checked by an order from the Committee of Public Safety to draft out of every company in the Northern army twenty picked Soldiers—Which body of chosen troops were immediately to act, with another column of Republicans against the Royalists in Brittany. Procrastination and the season of the year, with some calamitous events which took place at Nourmoutier, rendered the junction unnecessary; and while the Earl of Moira was beating about the coast, between Guernsey, Jersey, Lymington, and Spithead, the Convention acquired fresh confidence, and ordered General Pichegru to put his plans into execution. It may not be superfluous to ask on this occasion, Why a well appointed army, with every requisite for a descent, has not invariably been stationed upon the Hampshire or Sussex Coast? The unfortunate issue at Toulon should instruct us not to trifle with the stipulations we are under to the Royalists of La Vendee---Should they force their way to  
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sacrifices at Lyndhurst and Southampton ; but above all, let his voluntary exertions in Flanders, when he so successfully covered the Duke of York's retreat at Alost, determine. Too good to contradict the honest impulse of his mind, and too great to trifle with his duty, Earl Moira adopted the only alternative he had left, after having patiently submitted to be stripped of all the powers he had been promised, and wisely refused to cooperate in systems of military operation, against which both nature and art were stubbornly combined. Far be it from the writer of these observations to arraign unjustly, either the conduct of ministers, or lavishly to applaud the firmness of an individual, whose whole tenour of life has been uniformly honest and consistent. The stipulations he entered into with Administration---however cruelly disadvantageous to himself through the procrastination he had endured for several Months---were

St. Maloe, Havre De Grace, Cherburg or any other Port, Honour and necessity will have an instantaneous claim upon Earl Moira and his Troops.

worthy



worthy of a mind, which could instantly dismiss the prejudices of Party, to promote the general welfare of his country, by an exertion of acknowledged talents---How far the candour of his conduct has been answered by those he has endeavoured to assist, let the disposal of his brave little Army on the Continent, and the lukewarmness of ministerial cooperation with his original views in Britanny, decide. It may be said in answer to these remarks, that Mr. Pitt had a right, from the responsibility of his situation, to make use of individuals as occasions might demand; that Earl Moira, whose politics materially differed from those of Administration with respect to the original quarrel with France, and the plans pursued in it, was neither entitled to a participation of the secret views of the Cabinet, nor authorized to expect any larger portion of confidence than his partial capacity, as a Soldier, could require; that there was a necessity for troops to make up our losses in Flanders, and for the protection of our Islands in the West-Indies, and that every plausible pretext was fair speculation for the attainment

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ment of other ends. What these ends were or are, time only can develope. We shall content ourselves with asking ; whether the various insurrections in Paris have been industriously circulated at home to keep up the broken spirits of our Troops abroad ; whether Toulon has been taken and abandoned, and whether the Royalists in La Vendee have only been reported formidable, because the Minister has had some favourite system to accomplish ? Independent Companies have been probably raised, in order to produce a present fund of men and Money, at the manifest expence of hereafter, and to preserve, undiminished, that stock of patronage, without which his popularity must ultimately vanish.

If so, by what fatal mistake of circumstances has it happened, that although the object may have been partly obtained, the means which have been adopted to acquire it, must not only entail disgrace upon our arms, but ruin and bankruptcy on our credit ? The natural aversion which all Englishmen must have to Continental wars,  
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because they have invariably been destructive to the real interests of Great Britain, could only be surmounted by conjuring up alarms of the most unprecedented sort. I am apt to think with a very sensible writer "That the situation of this country is alarming enough to rouse the attention of every man who pretends to a concern for the public welfare." But it is very far from my belief, that the melancholy crisis to which we are reduced, has been produced by a spirit of discontent among the people without any provocation on the part of Government. "Appearances, as the same intelligent author remarks, justify suspicion ; and when the safety of a nation is at stake, suspicion is a just ground of enquiry. Let us enter into it with candour and decency. Respect is due to the station of Ministers ; and if a resolution must at last be taken, there is none so likely to be supported with firmness, as that which has been adopted with moderation."

It is not, I trust, in the power of any man to say, that the author of these cursory observations has departed from the  
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plain and unextended letter of fact.----He has, to the best of his ability, given a faithful detail of things, as they have occurred, and pointed out errors which the most melancholy experience hourly confirms. If we are to continue in systems of offensive operations abroad, let the complexion of our affairs at home assume a different hue. “ The ruin or prosperity of a state depends so much upon the administration of its government, that to be acquainted with the merit of a ministry, we need only observe the condition of the people. If we see them obedient to the laws, prosperous in their industry, united at home, and respected abroad, we may reasonably presume that their affairs are conducted by men of experience, abilities and virtue. If, on the contrary, we see an universal spirit of distrust and dissatisfaction, a rapid decay of trade, dissensions in all parts of the empire, and a total loss of respect in the eyes of foreign powers, we may pronounce, without hesitation, that the government of that country is weak, distracted and corrupt. The multitude in all countries are patient to a certain point.

Ill-usage may rouse their indignation, and hurry them into excesses, but the original fault is in government.

“ Without much political sagacity, or any extraordinary depth of observation, we need only mark how the principal departments of the state *have been* bestowed, and look no farther for the true cause of every mischief that befalls us\*.”

Before we finally quit a subject, full of blunders and mismanagement, from which it would be *Better Late than Never* to retreat, let us take a candid survey of the various manœuvres that have been resorted to, in order to secure to administration an implicit confidence in all their measures. Property, it will be found, has been visited to its remotest acre, by every trick of indefatigable cunning; Rank has been rendered subservient to ambition, and Principles have been perverted to make that policy succeed among the many, which more immediately answered the

\* See the first letter of Junius, pages 2 and 4.



purposes of a few. Influence and Patronage  
 ---Terms, though often mentioned, but seldom understood---had been so prodigally made use of by former ministers, that Mr. Pitt found it necessary to create *new calls* of service, in order to gratify the cravings of his friends. Time, and the natural casualties of life did not afford sufficient room for the unremitting influx of his Dependents; nor could he build new schemes upon the hacknied ways of his Predecessor, without too openly violating his duty to the nation. Entering into office with all the promises of *Reform* about him, he maintained advantages, for a time, which neither the acuteness of Mr. Sheridan could impair, nor the solid understanding of Mr. Fox could overturn. Possessed of the confidence of the Middle Class of People, to whom he had pledged himself never to give up their favourite wish for a more equal representation, &c. and secure in the support of the Nobility, whose Ostentation he had lavishly supplied, it naturally became his study so to steer between them, as neither to lose the assistance of the one, nor entirely forfeit the  
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good opinion of the other. The thinking part of the Nation, especially the Merchants, readily believed, because they eagerly wished; and the thoughtless, particularly the proud and needy, as warmly trusted, because they were too ignorant to direct themselves.

Placed upon this dangerous eminence, Mr. Pitt saw the Merchant, the Manufacturer and Mechanic patiently waiting for relief, by the reduction of Taxes, the Capitalists anxiously looking for a diminution of the National Debt, and the Majority of the Nation calling for a redress of grievances which he himself had openly acknowledged; he saw, or appeared to see, the Prerogative of the Crown manifestly stretched to the utmost limits of the Constitution; the Civil List of an enormous bulk, Pensions multiplied and Sinecures increased, without *one* benefit having been derived to the country, from the most glaring misapplication of public property; he saw the Dependencies of the Empire shamefully plundered by a set of Monopolists,

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whose private aggrandizement became a national dishonour; the tide of General Commerce shamefully turned into partial channels, and Corruption left unpunished in the several departments, because there had not been spirit or good sense enough among his predecessors to rectify abuses.

Naturally ambitious, he looked on the melancholy prospect before him, not only with indifference, but with seeming exultation, because it afforded him ample room for his financial talents. Like a Gambler without any permanent resources, he became daring, beyond example, and entered into schemes of the most indefinite Nature. Hence the funded system, by which he has been enabled to keep pace with a most enormous expenditure of treasure, and to baffle his opponents, on the question of solid speculation, by having the Alley\* at Command. The unfortunate Administration of Lord North afforded him every advantage he could wish. The principal sufferers in the lamentable con-

\* N. B. The floating Million.

test between Great Britain and her Colonies, were most unquestionably the Merchants and Manufacturers of the Island: To them, therefore, he naturally directed a mind which was fraught with expedients, and had all the plausibility of argument to second its suggestions. Eloquent in the House, and indefatigable in his researches after every species of technical knowledge abroad, he met the attacks of Opposition with unexampled confidence; and seemed to provoke questions on commercial objects, in order to expose the weakness of others, and to establish a character of his own upon the wreck of his Predecessor's.

The foregoing sheets may, perhaps, determine in the breast of every impartial man\*, how far Mr. Pitt has benefited by

\* The conversant in Scriptural Knowledge, will probably conclude, that "*Mr. Pitt has left undone those things he ought to have done; And he has done those things he ought not to have done.*" While the good of all Parties will exclaim—"Give Peace in our Time, O Lord.—Because there is none other that fighteth for us, but only thou, O God."

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the misfortunes of Lord North's Administration, or contributed to the fame and welfare of Great Britain by the superior Wisdom of his own.

OCTOBER 31,  
1794.

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